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INTRODUCTION I 1 
Iowa Schools, their boards and districts, were 
created by constitutional provision. l The State of Iona, 
in its legislature, had the authority to create school 
districts. The school districts, by definition of the 
Iowa Supreme Court, became "political subdivisions . . . 
called quasi-corporationsnZ of the state with the primary 
objective being to extend the educative program into its 
particular area of Iowa. As an agency of the state, the 
school district became cloaked in certain sanctions, 
privileges, and immunities. Late in the Nineteenth Cen- 
J 
J 
tury, when the Iowa Supreme Court endorsed the theory of 
sovereign immunity, that is, immunity from suit in its 
sovereign capacity, local school districts became likewise 
immune from suit, and statutory provisions proved not 
otherwise. Sovereign immunity has been the rule rather 
C 
than the exception as applied in courts around Iowa and the 
United States. A recent trend has developed in both 
courts and the legislature and the effect of that trend on 
the school district and the tort liability of the school 
l ~ ~ r r a  constitution, Article IX, Sections 1-15. 
Z~incaid v Hardin County, 53 Iowa 430, 5MV589 (le80). 
- 
2 
district in Iowa is the problem to be discussed in this 
study. The matter of individual employees has been the 
topic of previous studies. 1 
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose to be achieved by pursuing the trend 
in school district tort liability in Iowa was twofold. An 
examination of the status of the law relating to the tort 
liability(ies) of school districts in Iowa was one of the 
proposed objectives. The other and perhaps more challenging 
purpose was that of evaluating the changes in the law 
relative to school district liability in tort. Within the 
evaluation an analysis was made. From that analysis an 
attempt to predict the direction of the change in the law 
was based on the data gathered. 
11. THE NEED 
There has been a definite need for the many people 
involved in the school district endeavor to be made cogni- 
zant of the law as it now stands as well as the law in its 
new directions. Board members and administrators must be 
kept abreast of the trend in the law relative to the tort 
liability of school districts, so the business of making 
l~oland Kok, "Tort Liability in H. and P.E. 
Activities1' (unpublished Master's thesis, Drake University, 
Des Moines, Iowa, 1983). 
school policies and putting those policies into effect 
might be better achieved, Due to the fact that teachers, 
staff members and other members of the school district 
community are affected by legal trends regarding liability, 
there is a need for those people to be informed of the 
legal trend concerning school district tort liability. 
Members of the local community would be able to perform 
their duties as responsible citizens if they could recognize 
and react to the trend in the law concerning school district 
tort liability. With adequate cognizance of legal trends, 
citizens would be prompted to promote better laws. 
111. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I1 wi 11 include a review of literature and 
cases that give a foundation for the law as it now stands. 
Chapter 111 will present the data that shows the 
trend concerning the tort liability of school districts in 
Iowa. 
Chapter IV will summarize and conclude the status of 
the law. An evaluation of the trend will complete the report. 
IV. LIMITATIONS 
Each research project of this nature is limited in 
measure and/or direction. Because the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity was strlctly adhered to, cases involving the tort 
4 
liability of school districts have been decided on that 
basis alone. Adequate foundation for legal conclusions was 
found in several decisions. One of those areas is in state 
Supreme Court decisions cited in Iowa Supreme Court cases. 
The factors that tend to limit an analysis of any 
legal trend are several. One of those factors is the 
number of supreme court decisions that ruled on the tort 
liability of school districts or matters of a related area 
to which some comparison or analogy can be made. Recent 
legislative enactments add to or subtract from the depth 
of the analysis, School districts and not their individual 
officers and employees will be the matter of consideration 




That the law is changing is one of three basic f 
assumptions that m s t  be made. Judicial opinion may vary 
as to the merits of a certain case due to the fact that I 
1 
each member of the court may take a different view of the I I 
merits of that particular case, Jurisdictions investigated, 
both in Iowa and neighboring states, that have ruled on the 
tort liability of school districts naturally reflect the 
legislative provisions of that state. The greatest infla- 
ence exerted on the legislative provisions and court de- 
cisions concerning the tort liability of school districts 
5 
has stemmed from the philosophical approach each juris- 
diction pursued. If the state subscribes to the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, the laws and court decisions from 
that state are so limited. Conversely, if sovereign im- 
munity is not the state legal theme, the laws and decisions 
will so indicate, 
VI. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Certain definitions had to be enumerated for the 
puspose of a more clear cut understanding of the trend in 
school district tort liability. 
Sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity implies 
that the state or its political subdivisions (school dis- 
tricts included) cannot be sued. 1 
Tortious act. A tortious act is a civil or private 
-
conduct that results in a physical injury to the person or 
inJury to the reputation or feelings. 2 
Liability. Liability in the legal sense is the eli- 
gibility to be named and held responsible in a law 
Quasi. Quasi means almost, nearly, analogous to. 4 
'~la~k's Law Dictionar , (fourth edition; We3t Pub- 
lishing Company, Em+ 
6 
Respondeat superior. The respondeat superior is 
the superior responsible for the acts of his agents or em- 
ployees. 1 
VII. PROCEDURES 
Procedurally, the course followed in investigating 
the problem began with a review of literature and cases 
starting with an historical perusal of early English Common 
Law, when from a starting point at the year 1788, A.D. a 
brief analysis was made of the direction of the l a w  with 
factors that lent substance to changes and status of the 
laws concerning the tort liability school districts in Iowa. 
After the historical background of the problem was 
ascertained, an investigation of the status of the law at 
the time of the writing of this report was made. Selected 
legislative enactments served to establish what the law 
prescribed in some areas. Case studies depicted the way 
the legislative enactments were interpreted to meet indi- 
vidually different situations. It should be noted here that 
a law that finds itself in the statutes of a particular 
state never really has achieved its full force and effect 
until it has been used as an issue in that state's supreme 
court. Once the supreme court of a state acts upon a law, 
it then serves as legal precedence for ensuing cases. Law 
review articles serve to illuminate the problem in that 
7 
the articles consolidate similar cases based on the same 
legal precedence and quite homogeneous legislative pro- 
visions and seek to show the conflicts and parallels in 
some specific area of the law, 
A report and evaluation of the data was made giving 
a picture of the trend in school district liability for . 
tort. Immediately following a summary of the data, con- 
clusions were developed, showing the validity of the hy- 
pothesis that there was a definite trend concerning the 
tort liability of school districts in Iowa. Based on the 
presentation of the reported data, recommendations were made 
pertaining directly to possible solution of the problem, the 
trend concerning the tort liability of school districts in 
Iowa. 
CHAPTER I1 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE--HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Historically, suits against agencies or political 
subdivisions of the state where the state is immune from 
suit have not been successful because court interpretation 
has generally been that the state and its agencies are 
immune from suit. 
The rule is well settled that the state, unless it 
has assumed such liability by constitutional mandate 
or legislative enactment, is not liable for injuries 
arising from the negligence or other tortious acts or 
conduct of any of its officers, agents, or servants, 
committed in the performance of their dutiesal 
The doctrine of governmental i m n i t y  by which the 
sovereign state has been held i m n e  from liability for 
acts of negligence committed by its agents or servants in 
the exercise of a governmental function, such as a per- 
petuating of the state's endeavor at the local school dis- 
trict level, is a doctrine of long duration. The case to 
which some historians point as the beginning point of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity was tried in England in 
1788. Russell v -- Men of ~evon.' Russell, a citizen of Devon, 
'"states, Territories, and Dependencies," American 
Jurisprudence, IL, Chapter 76, p. 288. 
P~ussell v Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 2 T.R. 
667 ( 1 7 8 8 7  
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sued the men in his village because of their negligence in 
constructing and maintaining a bridge which collapsed and 
caused inJury to his horse and wagon. The court denied the 
action because: (1) to permit it would lead to an infinity 
of actions, (2) there was no precedent for attempting such 
a suit, (3)  only the legislature should impose liability of 
this kind, (4)  even if defendants are to be considered a 
corporation or quasi-corporation, there is no fund out of 
which to satisfy the claim, ( 5 )  neither law nor reason 
supports the action, (6) there is a strong presumption that 
what has never been done cannot be done, and ( 7 )  although 
there is a legal principle which permits a remedy for every 
injury resulting from the neglect of another, a more appli- 
cable principle is that it is better that an individual 
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer 
an fnconvenience. The court concluded that the suit should 
not be permitted "because the action must be brought against 
the public,n1 not the men of the village individually. 
Some historians urge that the doctrine of govern- 
mental immunity stems from the early English concept that 
the king can do no wrong.' Whether or not the doctrine 
came from such a beginning, it is now no longer a part of 
2 ~ .  F. Plucknett, A Concise Histor of the Common Law 
+)T - -(fffth edition: Little, BTown, 8 CO., 
English law.' Over a hundred years ago Chief Jastice 
Cockburn, presiding over the King's Bench, said in the case 
of Feather v Regina, "From the maxim that the king can do 
no wrong, it follows as a necessary consequence that the 
king cannot authorize a wrong. "' That school districts 
throughout Iowa and the United States would someday be 
directly affected by such a statement seemed improbable. 
Courts in Iowa had, until very recently, strongly 
maintained that the doctrine of governmental immunity had 
value and the state supreme court frequently refused to 
modify the rule. The Iowa Supreme Court in 1880, in the 
case of Kincaid v Hardin county3 quoted from a case that 
had been tried before the same court twelve years earlier 
saying 
. . . the decisions are almost (though not wholly) 
uniform, to the effect that counties and other quasi- 
corporations are not liable to private actions for the 
neglect of their officers . . . , unless the statute 
has in so many words, created the liability, specially 
giving the action to the party in~ured.4 
The single exception to the immunity doctrine as 
applied in Iowa is found in Wilson and Gustin v Jefferson 
l ~ a r l  Stafford, "Tort Liability of School Districts," 
Elementary School Journal, WM (~eptember, 1929), 34-50. 
2~cathcr v Regins ' 2 2  Eng. Rep. 1191 (1863). 
'~incaid v Hardin County, 53 Iowa 430 (1880). 
'Isoper v Henry County, 26 Iowa 264 (1868). 
1 1  
~0unty.l The principle involved in that case dealt with 
whether or not a county (political subdivision of the state) 
is liable for negligence in the construction and maintenance 
of its bridges, The court felt it was: 
We think so because the county is charged with the 
duty of building and maintaining bridges, and even 
repairing them, when the requisite expenditure for 
doing so is large, This duty involves the correspond- 
ing obligation or liability to pay damages resulting 
from a neglect of the samem2 
Later cases also held counties in Iowa liable for negli- 
gence in bridge maintenance,3 
Teachers, administrators, and school board members 
have been sued individually and held liable in tort,4 bat 
school districts, being cloaked with the same immtlni ty from 
suit that the state has, have not. The presentation of data 
to follow will give light to the fact that a trend is pre- 
sently being felt with regard to tort claims against the 
state of Iowa, its agencies, quasi-corporations, and poli- 
tical subdivisions. That the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
is failing and the effect of that failing on school districts 
will be pointed out in the following pages. 
lwilson Gustin v Jefferson Count 13 Iowa 181 
(1862) ; a l s o H u s ~ s ~ o ~ o w a  - County, 4 3-+' owa 450 (1876). 
3Mortland v Mitchell County, 40 Iowa 394 (1874). 
CHAPTER 111 
THE TREND 
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 9 specifically allows 
the state to sue and be sued. nThe state may sue in the same 
way as an individual . , , . It may be sued as provided by 
any statutes in force at the time. "l Later, the legislature 
saw fit to allow recovery to people who were injured as a 
result of some activity of the state. The problem, however, 
is that the statute passed by the legislature had a very 
limiting effect in that it required consent on the part of 
the state to be sued. The applicable portion of the statute 
from the Code of Iowa (1962) in 5613.8 reads: 
upon the conditions herein provided for the protection 
of the state, the consent of the state is hereby given, 
to be made a party to any suit or action which is now 
pending or which may hereafter be brought in any of the 
district courts of Iowa. . . . 2 
In other words, the state allowed itself to be sued, but 
only after it had given permission to be sued. The permis- 
sion was to come from the legislature. Because school 
districts acted as 
agents or instrumentalities of the state in the per- 
formance of a governmental function for which the state 
is primarily responsible . . . they partake of the 
state's sovereignty with respect to tort 1iabilitym3 
'state of Iowa, Code -- of -9 Iowa RCP9 (1962). 
%tats of Iowa, Code of Iowa, g613.8 (1962). 
386 A.L.R. _ - -  1 489. 
13 
The tort liability of the school district, then, depends 
o n  the same liability the state might have. If sovereign 
immunity is strongly adhered to in the courts of the state, 
the school district need not be prepared to defend itself 
for tortious conduct committed on its behalf, By the same 
token, if the legislature sees fit to allow suit against a 
school district, liability may exist. "The government of 
all school districts is within legislative control, n 1 
At one time municipal corporations, that is, 
villages, towns, and cities were felt to be immune from suit, 
but the Supreme Court saw fit to differentiate 
between municipal corporations, as incorporated villages, 
towns and cities, and those other organizations, such 
as . . . counties, school districts and the like which 
are established without any express charter, or act of 
incorporation, and clothed with but limited powers. 2 
But as previously indicated, the courts saw fit to make an 
exception to that rule in regard to allowing recovery in 
tort against counties for the negligent maintenance of 
bridges. At the outset of this study it would appear that 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is strictly endorsed by 
both the legislature and the supreme court, but exceptions 
have sprung up that show a trend leading away from the 
rigid enforcement of that rule. 
'wise - v Palmer, 165 Iowa 731, 147 FMI 167 (1914). 
'~incaid v Hardin County, 53 Iowa 430, 5 NW 589. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa has heard six cases that 
deal directly with the liability of school districts. Each 
case is unique in that although the doctrine of governmental 
immunity lies at the base of each case, opinions of the 
court vary in later cases of the same nature or differ some- 
what in cases of a closely related nature. As previously 
mentioned, the court made certain distinctions as to who or 
what could be hidden from liability by virtue of the state's 
sovereign rights.' In 1882 the court said: 
A school district is a public corporation, or quasi- 
corporation, created by statute for the purpose of 
executing the general laws and policy of the state, 
which require the education of all its youth. It is a 
branch of the state government, an instrument for the 
administration of the laws, and is, so far as the 
people are concerned, an involuntary organization. . . . 
In these respects it is not different from a county, 
except that its functions and the purposes of its 
organization are more restricted and not so numerous. 2 
It should be stated at this point that now school districts 
are attempting and succeeding in covering many more far 
reaching areas in their educational endeavors than the court 
may have anticipated in 1882. Schools are now involved in 
electronics, television, radio, and driver's education and 
as such extend themselves into a greater number of situations 
that could result in tortious conduct. 
Kincaid v Hardin County. 
'LOW= v District Twp of Woodbury, 58 Iowa 452, 12 
Nw 478 (18n2). 
Notwithstanding the lone exception of the counties 
liabilities in tort for the maintenance of bridges,l coun- 
ties and their employees found that the court would find 
cause to make more exceptions, thus further reducing the 
force and effect of governmental immunity in Iowa. 
In Hibbs v Independent School ~istrict' the court 
saw fit to extend the shelter of sovereign immunity to an 
employee of a school district, thus relieving him of lia- 
bility. In this instance it was a negligent act allegedly 
committed by the employee that resulted in injury to the 
plaintiff, a school girl who was thrown from a bus negli- 
gently operated by an agent of the school district. The 
agent achieved that status by virtue of a contract to trans- 
port pupils on behalf of the school district. In finding 
for the employee of the school district, the court admitted: 
No case against an employee of a school corporation 
directly involving personal liability on his part for 
negligence causing injury to a pupil has been called 
to the attention of the court. No reason would seem 
to exist, however, for granting exemption from 1 ia- 
bility to the employees of other municipal corporations 
whose negligence has resulted in injuries or damages 
for which relief is sought, where the same arose while 
the municipality was engaged in the performance of a 
governmental function and to deny the same to an em- 
ployee of a school corporation when similarly engagedm3 
Wilson - 8 Gustin v Jefferson County. 
Z~ibbs v Independent School District, 218 Iowa 841, 
251 w 6 0 m 3 3 ) .  
16 
The a d m i n i s t r a t o r  of  t h e  estate  of  one A r t h u r  Larsen  
b r o u g h t  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  Independent  School District  of 
Kane Township i n  1937. The a c t i o n  a r o s e  when M r .  Larsen, 
a  s e r v i c e  amputee, cl imbed t h e  s t a g e  a t  a  Council  B l u f f s  
s c h o o l  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  schoo l  c h i l d r e n  a t  a n  A r m i s t i c e  Day 
c e l e b r a t i o n .  The p l a i n t i f f  a l l e g e d  t h a t  t h e  schoo l  d i s t r i c t  
was n e g l i g e n t  i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and maintenance o f  t h e  
s t a i r s  and immedia te ly  a d j a c e n t  e n v i r o n s  and because  o f  t h a t  
n e g l i g e n c e  Mr. Larsen  f e l l  and l a t e r  d ied .  The Supreme 
C o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  schoo l  d i s t r i c t  was immune f rom l i a -  
b i l i t y  as p r e d i c a t e d  i n  Lane v  
-
District Township ( s u p r a ) ,  
which  i n  t u r n  looked t o  Kincaid  v Hardin  County ( s u p r a ) ,  
f o r  l e g a l  precedence .  1  
T h a t  v e r y  same y e a r ,  1937, t h e  c o u r t  modif ied  t h e  
r u l e  i n  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  immunity of  a n  employee o f  a q u a s i -  
c o r p o r a t i o n ,  i n  t h i s  I n s t a n c e ,  Keokuk County. The p l a i n -  
t i f f  i n  S h i r k e y  v Keokuk County s u f f e r e d  i n j u r i e s  when h e r  
c a r  r a n  i n t o  a  t r a c t o r  d r i v e n  by t h e  defendant ,  a n  employee 
o f  t h e  coun ty .  The i n c i d e n t  took p l a c e  a f t e r  d a r k  and i t  
was a l l e g e d  t h a t  t h e  de fendan t  was g u i l t y  o f  n e g l i g e n c e  
b e c a u s e  he was d r i v i n g  h i s  t r a c t o r  wi thou t  i t s  l i g h t s  on, 
Al though  t h e  c o u r t  found f o r  t h e  c o u n t y  and i t s  employee, 
a v i g o r o u s  d i s s e n t  was r e g i s t e r e d  by J u s t i c e  M i t c h e l l  who 
' ~ a r s e n  v  School District, 223 Iowa 691, 272 Nm 
632 ( 1 9 3 7 ' r  
said, concluding: 
An act of misfeasance is a positive wrong, and 
every employee, whether employed by a private person 
or a municipal corporation, owes a duty not to in- 
jure another Person by a negligent act of commission, 
It is the breach of this duty which the law imposes 
on all men that is involved, and this general obli- 
gation to injure no man by a negligent act of mis- 
feasance is neither increased nor diminished by the 
fact that the negligent party is an employee of a 
municipal corporation, 1 
This dissenting opinion acted as the gateway to allow re- 
covery against negligent employees of a quasi-corporation, 
The opinion stemmed on the term nmisfeasance" as opposed 
to nonfeasance in allowing recovery from a tort feasor in 
the employ of a heretofore non-suable employer. 
The next year the court that had chosen to extend 
the doctrine of governmental immunity to a person in the 
employ of a quasi-corporation, decided to constrict the 
scope of that protection and allow recovery from an em- 
ployee who committed an act of negligence that resulted in 
injury. The defendant in Montanick v McMillan was a truck 
driver employcd by the defendant Wapello County. The plain- 
tiff m s  a young O t t u m  boy who was injured *hen his bike was 
.truck by a truck driven by the employee of the county* 
~ ~ ~ l i ~ ~ n c e  m s  alleged and recovery allowed as the court 
v ~ e o k u k  county, 225 Kowa 1159, 275 NW 
706 (1937 
in overruling previous decisions on the subject said: 
The exemption of governmental bodies and their 
officers from liability under the doctrine of save- 
~~ - -  
reign immunity is an exception to respondant superior 
doctrine and in no wam affects the fundamental princi- 
-- -of torts that one who wrongfully inflicts injury 
-----
u on ano her is liable to the injured person for 
k a +  -- - 
A unique situation came to the Iowa Supreme Court's 
attention in 1939. The plaintiff, the father of a school- 
age daughter, sought to recover money from Independent 
School District number 4, Union Township, in Mitchell 
County. His claim was that he had driven his daughter to 
and from school, a distance of over two and a half miles 
each way for several years and that, by statutory provision, 
it was the responsibility of the school district to provide 
such transportation. Furthermore, the father alleged that 4 
1 
the defendant school district knew of the situation and I 
because the defendant made no arrangement to transport the 
child, an implied contract developed whereby the plaintiff 
could recover for expenditures he incurred by so trans- 
porting his daughter. In ruling for the school district 
and reasserting the doctrine of governmental immunity that 
applies to quasi-corporations of that nature, the court 
went a step further in drawing the lines within which a 
school district may operate without incurring liability. 
l ~ o ~ ~ a n i c k  v McMi 1 lan, 225 Iowa 442, 280 MV 603 
(1938). 
19 
The opinion read in part: 
. . . this duty was not a mere 
ministerial function as the transportation of pupils to 
and from school is a governmental function. . . The 
language definitely States that school districts, while in 
the performance of gove~nmental functions need not worry 
about liability resulting from injuries or wrongs committed 
performing those functions. Conceivably the court had 
something in mind when it gave mention to ministerial, or 
proprietary functions. This may be termed a further refine- 
ment as to how far the doctrine of immunity would or would 
not go in protecting school districts. 
In the case of Kincaid v Hardin County, the supreme 
court of Iowa took very definite measures to differentiate 
"between municipal corporations, as incorporated villages, 
towns and cities, and those other organizations, such as 
. . . counties, school districts and the like. . . . " The 
court modified that view somewhat in the following case when 
it felt that the immunity of a governmental agency from 
liability for negligence in the exercise of its governmental 
functions did not exempt it from liability for a nuisance 
created and maintained by that agency, the school district= 
Ners v Independent School District Sioux 
-
' ~ r u ~ ~ e m a n  v - School District, 227 Iowa 661, 289 NAI 
5 (1939). 
2~upra, Kincaid v Hardin County* 
School District, 230 Iowa 771, 
298 NW 885941 
20 
was suit for nuisance. Ness, the plaintiff, alleged that 
the school district was negligent in creating and main- 
taining a nuisance. Nessf property was immediately adjacent 
to a school yard where the children played softball. On 
numerous occasions softballs would be hit or thrown onto 
Nessf property. As a result his house and yard and garden 
were damaged. Ness protested to the school district on many 
occasions and when he did not achieve his desired results, 
brought legal action against the school district. The de- 
fendant school district countered that it was immune from 
liability. In accordance with the statutory provision for- 
bidding nuisance, the court found for Ness and quoting in 
part from a previous case said: 
For the exercise of purely governmental functions 
a municipal corporation is not lia3le. The creation 
and maintenance of a nuisan e is very clearly not a 
governmental function . . . F 
The Ness case served to farther delineate the area within 
which school districts may conduct their activities and 
still enJoy the shelter of immunity. That shelter changes 
in scope as the number of cases recorded increases. 
The scope of the doctrine of governmental immunity 
suffered a sharp blow in 1951. C. A. Brown sought damages 
from the city of Sioux City when he alleged that the city 
was negligently responsible for the death of his bees. 
21 
Employees of the city had sprayed a certain area of that 
city's income property and through their alleged negli- 
gence, Brown's bees died. The Iowa court found for Brown 
believing that a municipal corporation holding property 
for profit, or deriving an income therefrom, is liable for 
negligence in the management of the property to the same 
extent that individuals and business corporations are 
liable. 1 
Mr. Justice Smith in his opinion written in the 
case of Florey v City of Burlington indicated the Iowa Su- 
-
preme Courts desire to further weaken the rule of govern- 
mental immunity. Young Miss Florey, a minor, was injured 
when she fell off a pathway in a Burlington city park. The 
allegation was that the city was negligent by not guarding 
against such an accident. The city responded that main- 
taining a park is a function that was governmental in nature 
and therefore the city was not liable, Justice Smith felt 
that: 
The municipality, like any private corporation, is 
subject to tort liability and the rule of respondent 
superior when engaged in purely proprietary activity, 
The problem arises when it performs governmental 
functions committed to it by the state. Such functions 
do not become proprietary by their delegation. Never- 
theless tort liability may arise if the municipal 
corporation negligently fails to perform its govern- 
mental duty and dangerous conditions result which 
l~rown v - Sioux Clty, 242 Iowa 1196, 49 N W 2 D 853, 
(1951 1. 
cause injury to one properly availing himself of the 
tendered service. 
In light of all the previously cited cases in this study 
to this point, it can be seen that this case does more to 
weaken the rule of sovereign immunity than any of the others. 
The court mentions the trend away from immunity in this 
case, but refuses to abrogate that rule entirely, saying: 
" ~ n y  substantial modification of it must come from the 
legislature. W Z  
It must be remembered that the Iowa court held for 
a very long time that school districts and counties were 
quasi-corporations and could not be sued. Later, the rule 
was extended to include employees of those quasi-corpora- 
tions. In 1957, the court was asked to decide whether or 
not the operation of a hospital by a county constituted a 
governmental or proprietary function. The difference was 
determined. With the thought in mind that the school 
districts in Iowa are and have been consolidating in order 
to insure a greater wealth of resources with which to pro- 
mote the school district endeavor, the following statement 
from Wittmer v ~etts3 is set oat: Dillon, Municipal 
Corporations, 5th Ed sec 109, as folloan: 
l ~ l ~ r e t ~  v City - of Burlington, 247 Iowa 316, 73NARd 
(1955). 
3~ittrncr v -* Letts 248 Iowa 648, 80NP!Zd 561 (1957). 
In its governmental Or public character the corpor- 
ation is made, by the state, one of its instruments, 
or the local depository of certain limited or pre- 
scribed political powers, to be exercised for the 
public good on behalf of the state, rather than for 
itself. But in its proprietary or private character, 
the theory is that the powers, are supposed not to be 
conferred, primarily or chiefly, from considerations 
connected with the government of the state at large, 
but for the private advantage of compact community, 
which is incorporated as a distinct legal personality, 
or corporate individual; and as to such powers and to 
property acquired thereunder, and contracts made with 
reference thereto, the corporation is to be regarded 
quad hoc as a private corporation, at least not public 
in the sense that the power of the legislature ov r 
it or its rights represented by it is omnipotent. f 
It seems in defining a county as a municipal corporation 
the court differed from the definition set out in Kincaid 
v Hardin County (supra) in reference to counties and school 
districts and quasi-corporations. In that case the Iowa 
court polnted out that counties and school districts were I 
quasi-corporat ions, not municipal corporations like cities, 
towns, or villages. 2 
With the increasing number of injuries arising from 
motor vehicle accidents involving agents of the sovereign, 
the legislators saw fit to influence its agents to right 
I 
1 
their wrongs. A statutory provision allowing the purchase 
of liability insurance w a s  passed and its effect was to 
further deny the absolute application of governmental 
immunity in Iowa. The legislature felt that inJured parties 
l ~ i  1 lon, Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed scc 109. 
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in Iowa should have monetary redress for negligent acts of 
state employees and others. The Code of Iom, CJ 517A,. in 
--- 
part reads: 
All state ~ o ~ ~ s s ~ o ~ s ,  departments, boards and 
agencies of all political subdivisions of the State 
of Iowa, not otherwise authorized, are hereby author- 
ized and empowered to purchase and pay the premiums 
on liability and property damage insurance covering 
and insuring all officers and employees of such com- 
missions, departments, boards and agencies while in 
the performance of their duties and operating an auto- 
mobile, truck, tractor, machinery, or other vehicles 
owned or used by said commissions, boards, departments 
and agencies, which insurance shall insure, cover and 
protect against individual personal legal liability 
that said officers or employees may incur.l 
Due to the ruling of the supreme court that the employees 
of the municipalities and quasi-corporations of the state 
could no longer find refuge in the immunity doctrine, the 
legislature saw fit to allow purchase of liability insur- 
ance so inJured parties might be recompensed. 
The immunity doctrine as applied to school districts 
in Iowa was further modified in 1961. In Monroe v Razor 
Construction Company,' the defendant Razor Construction 
Company was a contracted employee of the Clinton School 
District. The defendant was employed to build a school and 
swimming pool for the school district. bnroe, the plaintiff, 
'state of Iowa, - -  Code of Iowa C 517A (1962), passed 
1959. 
ZMonros v Razor Construction Company, 252 Iowa 1249, 
~ ~ O N W Z ~  2 m 6 1 ) -  
alleged that the defendant negligently set off explosions 
in its operations that resulted in damage to the 
property* The Iowa Court felt that the defendant 
was negligent and liable in tort saying in part: 
When the Work is done by an independent contractor 
for a governmental body, and he operates in accordance 
with the plans and specifications of the government, 
he has the same imunity, and no recovery may be had 
. . but, if there had been negligence on the part of 
the defendants, they could claim no share in govern- 
mental immunity from suit.1 
That language of the court allows innnunity in one instance 
and removes it in another. From the cases cited to this 
point in the development of the trend, it can be seen how 
the doctrine of sovereign imunity relating to school 
districts has been altered and, by the same token, weakened. 
Finally, in 1963, three members of the Iowa supreme 
court in an opinion specially concurring with the majority 
of the court written in %ore v Murphy indicated a desire 
to completely abrogate the immunity doctrine with special 
attention given to the liability of school districts. Al- 
though the case itself did not question the doctrine of 
Sovereign immunity the court said: 
1t has been argued on behalf of the defendants that 
if immunity is abolished public schools will be deluged 
with claims for inJuries resulting from inadequate 
supervision, from frostbite while miting for busses* 
from blows struck by other children, from forbidden 
and mischievous activities impulsively and foolishly 
inspired, and from a host of other causes* 
11bid. -
children have a special status in the eyes of the law, 
and in view of the C O ~ ~ U ~ S O ~ Y  attendance statute, de- 
Serve more than o ~ d ; n n ~ ~ r  n-ntsr* a r -  n- - - -~ * - -  - -  I 
- -  --  --..-. 
r A  V I . F . ~ C I + V I I .  vyara.cing an educational system has been described as one of the 
-_I_ 
nation's biggest businesses. ( e m p h a s i ~ s ~ l ~ d ~ T h e  
fact that subdik ' risions of the government now enjoy no 
irnmunitv in a number nf srenc nf  m ~ t : ~ . a + - ~  LA- --a 1 
noLiceaDly circumscribed their usefulness or rendered 
them insolvent. 
Nor have oar privately endowed schools and colleges 
been forced to close their doors or curtail their aca- 
demic and extra-curricular program because the law has 
imposed on them liability for the negligence of their 
employees in dealing with students and the public. 
Whatever may have been the economy in the time of I 
"Men of Devon." it is absurd tcldav t h a t  srhnnl d Z q t r Z r t -  
cannot today expeditiously plan for and dispose of tort 
claims based on the doctrine of respondent superior. 
With such a wide trend established by these and other 
---- 
decisions those who rely on immunity as a defense must 
realize our court-made doctrine of aovernmental immunity 
-
be subjectedto - a re-examinan05 --- in the near futureil 
i s  supplie;ir. 
In Cherokee, in 1963, two patrolmen conducted a spot i 
I 
check on automobiles and due to their negligence in the per- t 
formance of their duty, a plaintiff's house was damaged. The 
Iowa court felt that the city employees were liable for mis- 
feasance within the realm of their specified dutiesOZ This 
case went a step farther away from the doctrine of immunity. 
The most recent case to appear before the Iowa 
Supreme Court concerning the tort liability of school I 
11 I - - - -  .. u . . ~ ~ ~ . .  1 nwa . 119 NW 2d 759, from 
-n ' lvYI-e  v N l U L  --..- 
S ancl v m s  ~*hool District (hinnesota) 118 Zd h. _ _ _ L I  
ZTnhm.rrnn v Baker. 1 0- 
L7 
districts is  BOY^^ v 1~sA4.l The Boyer case may be held - I 
in years to come as the landmark in establishing the fact 
that school districts can be held liable in tort. 
A high school basketball tournament was held at a 
Nlson City school. Due to the alleged negligence of the 
defendant school district, a section of the bleachers 
collapsed, thereby injuring the plaintiff. The name was 
held under the auspices of the Iowa High School Athletic 
Association. The school district, by contract, was to re- 
ceive money for so conducting the affair. The Iowa court 
narrowly found for the defendants in a 5-4 verdict. The 
opinion of the maJority read in part as follows: 
We are fully aware of the trend away from govern- 
mental immunity. We took note of it in . . . Florey 
v City - of Burlington. The wrfter Joined in a specially I 
-- 
concurring opinion to Moore v Murphy, which warned that I 
the doctrine of governnental immunity might be re- I 
examined in the near future. This has now been done. 
The conclusion reached from such a re-examination is, 
or stated, that abrogation of the doctrine should come 
from legislative, not Judicial action. I 
Mr. Justice Moore's dissent in this case was most I 
vigorous and will undoubtedly be the basis of future actions I I 
against school districts. At one point in his dissenting I 
opinion, Justice Moore quotes from 75 ALR 1196: 
The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from lia- 
b l  litv for tort rests upon a rotten foundation. It is 
IBO er v Iowa Hi h School Athletic Association, 
Iowa - 5 7 7  J N ~ O E + $ C  
incredible that in this modern age of comparative 
sociological en1 lghtenment, and in a republic, the 
medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in the 
maxim, "the k i n g  can do no wrong," should exempt 
the various branches of the government from lia- 
bility for their torts, and that the entire burden of 
damage resulting from the wrongful acts of the govern- 
ment should be imposed upon the single individual who 
suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the 
entire community constituting the government, where 
it could be borne without hardships upon any indi- 
vidual, and where it justly be10n~s.l 
Later in his opinion, Justice &ore summed up the feeling of 
nearly all legal authorities who have written about the 
doctrine of immunity: "The law should be progressive; it 
should advance with changing conditions. "' In light of the 
opinion s e t  forth in Moore v Murphy, it would appear that 
the immunity formerly enjoyed by school districts is 
rapidly dissolving. 
In the spring of 1965 the Iowa General Assembly 
passed what it called the Iowa Tort Claims ~ c t . ~  The pur- 
pose of this a c t  to allow claims against the state for 
lnjurles committed by certain named agencies or agents 
the state. Although school districts are not among those 
named in this bill, the overall concept of the of 
governmental immunity from liability in tort ms 
weakened.  he trend away from that doctrine is not 
I75 ALR 1196. 
2supra, Johnson v Baker* 
3senatc ~ i l c  322, 1GA62. No 0th" cites 
at time 03TiE printing. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUS ION 
The Purpose to be achieved by pursuing the trend 
~oncerning the tort liability of school districts in Iowa 
was twofold. An examination of the status of the law 
relating to the tort liability(ies) of school districts in 
Iowa was one of the proposed objectives. The other pro- 
posed objective was to evaluate the changes in the law 
relative to school district liability. 
By its own admittance in the more recent cases in- 
volving immunity, the courts of Iowa have created a rule 
that must be abrogated. Early in this study it was shown 
how immunity was extended to anyone involved in the govern- 
mental endeavor. Later the definition of what constituted 
a governmental function was refined. Still later those who 
made up that group known as employees of the sovereign was 
the topic of consideration. As the court moved away from 
the theory of sovereign immunity, so did the legislature. 
NOW in 1965, the move is nearly complete and the school dis- 
tricts of Iowa stand out as the exception to a rule that in 
itself is a n  exception to the law of torts--"Every wrong de- 
mands redress. n 1 
l~rosser and Yoang, Cases and Materials on Torts 
(third edition; 1962). 
Perhaps no principle of law has been under such 
persistent attack over the years. Quite recently, the 
doctrine of governmental immunitv has henn r n c t  ~ p r r l ~  4 -  
many 
gated the doctrine of governmental immunity, either by 
opinions from their supreme courts or by legislative enact- 
ment. These states include: California, Florida, Washing- 
ton, New York, Arizona, Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, and New Mexico, 
The California court pointed out that immunity from 
liability for tort has never been the prevailing law in the 
United States. "In formulating 'rules and exceptions we 
are apt to forget that when there is negligence, the rule 
is liability, Immunity is the exception. n 1 
The Illinois court that saw the immunity of school 
districts wiped away emphatically stated: 'we conclude 
that the rule of school district immunity is unjust, un- 
supported by any valid reason, and has no rightful place in 
modern day society. nZ 
~ h c  onclusion is quite clear that the trend leading 
away from governmental immunity i s  very real. loaa 
Y ----  - - w e .  ---" UI&UV A , I  
states. As of 1965 at least twelve states have abro- 
l ~ ~ ~ ~ k ~  f v Cornin Hos ital District, 11 Cal Rep 
5 5  Ca ,d, 3 d 4 h ) .  
z~~~~~~~ v Kancland Co~ltKtunlty Unit District, l8 
163 N= ( 1 r  
31 
districts in the Pursuance of the educational endeavor will 
no longer find themselves shielded by the cloak of immunity. 
The Iowa Court has followed its neighboring state supreme 
courts on many occasions. In its own words, the Iowa su- 
preme court has set out in dictum: 
"The whole doctrine of 
governmental imuni ty rests upon a rotten foundat ion."' 
The trend shows the way to the very near future that the 
school districts in Iowa will be liable for their torts 
and the torts of their employees. 
Only the vestigial remains of such governmental 
immunity have survived; its requiem has long been 
foreshadowed. For years the process of erosion of 
governmental immunity has gone on unabated. The 
legislature has contributed mightily to that 
erosion. The courts & distributibn - and extension, 
have r e m o v ~ m e t h e  ------- force of the rule. 
T-lics ~ ~ ~ p l i e d )  Thus. in holdinq that the doc- 
trine of governmental inkunity for torts for which 
its agents are liable has no place in our law; we 
make no startling break wlth the past, but merely 
take the final step that carries to its conclusion 
an eatablished legislative and Judicial trend.'! 
I. ANALYSIS 
Immunity enJoyed by the school districts in Iowa 
may be considered to have had a reasonable beginning. At 
that time the scope of the school district endeavor was 
extremely restricted and, although the schools were 
I Supra, Moore v Murphya 
'supra, Mueskopf v county Hos~ftal* 
satisfactory for their time, by present day standards, they 
achieved little. Today, schools are big business. school 
districts attempt to delve into areas that at the turn of 
the century ~ o u l d  have staggered the imagination of even 
the most progressive-minded citizen, The schoo 1 districts 
in Iowa have entered areas of driverts education, aviation 
instruction, computer programing, welding, sheet metal 
work, commercial and industrial electronics, radio and tele- 
vision--the list of school district endeavors is endless. 
NOW with the scope increasing, the Iowa school districts 
must be on guard, The expansion of education in the state 
places the school districts into situations that could 
result in inJury to innocent parties. No longer can the 
school district defend itself by pleading a lack of funds 
to allow for the recovery of tort claims. No longer can the 
school district claim that its duties are strictly govern- 
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